I want to say at the outset that I will be splitting my time with the member for Thornhill .
I want to make it clear that we see there is a need for changes to be made to assist law enforcement in this digital age. I saw, a number of years ago, in the wake of a 5-4 decision of the Supreme Court on Bykovets revolving around the idea of the reasonable expectation of privacy in the case of a credit card fraud case, that the methods being used by law enforcement to investigate these crimes, and many other crimes that take place digitally, had been severely curtailed. I worked with my local RCMP integrated childhood exploitation unit and other stakeholders. I think a good solution is contained in what is considered part 1 of Bill C-22 .
That is not to say that Conservatives and I do not have issues with part 1. There are issues. There are questions about the thresholds, be it a reason to suspect or a reason to believe. One of the thresholds, the one that was chosen by the government, is far lower, but essentially, I believe, as Conservatives, we can support part 1, because we know that, if law enforcement has to reach out to a telecommunications company or an electronic service provider, they do not know whether that provider actually provides a service to an IP address, a name or a phone number, and they have to write a warrant for that process. That is a very time-consuming process for law enforcement. It is like searching for a needle in a haystack. It is very difficult.
As such, part 1 of the legislation seeks to create a subscriber confirmation, and I think that this could be an effective way to have something that does not require a warrant and to ask electronic service providers and telecommunications companies a simple yes-or-no question: Do they provide services to an IP address, or do they provide services to a number? I think that this could really cut down on the bureaucratic red tape that law enforcement faces. It could help speed up investigations. That is why, as Conservatives, despite some of the concerns that experts have raised, like civil liberty groups and Canadian Bar Association, we can work with that
However, where we really get into the weeds is with the concerns we set out on part 2 of the legislation. Before I get into the concerns on part 2, as they are very technical in nature, but very important, I want to provide a bit of an overview of what happened at committee.
This is very far-reaching legislation. It proposes to radically remake the entire paradigm of investigations in Canada. While I recognize that there need to be reforms, when we are dealing with something of this magnitude, that is not something that can be rushed. This is not necessarily because members just want to be oppositional for the sake of opposition. However, it is actually in the government's, and all of Canada's, best interests that parliamentarians really scrutinize the legislation, because we know that the legislation is going to be contested in the courts in the future, and we want to make sure that we have the best legislation so that it is actually effective at doing the job.
What Canadians fear is that the government could potentially misuse it, and maybe not even the government but malicious actors and criminal actors could misuse the vulnerabilities that the government would be creating through the legislation.
At committee we heard from many witnesses, but the amount of time that we had to hear from witnesses was extremely truncated. It was over a short matter of weeks in two-hour meetings, where we had panels of very intelligent experts who had a lot to say about the legislation. Every day I was getting emails from the public safety committee clerk with new submissions and briefs. We simply did not have the appropriate time to really dissect the legislation and go deep down into the far-reaching, potentially negative impacts of it so the process became very rushed.
It was a real sea change because, prior to the government's manufactured majority, it actually had to work with other parties in order to get legislation passed. The cybersecurity legislation came forward, and there were some really strong amendments put forward by opposition parties in this House that were adopted. I think it really made the legislation stronger. However, ever since the government received its manufactured majority, it has not been interested in working with other parties. Now we see that it is using this programming motion to try to ram through the legislation so that we cannot scrutinize it further.
I respect the members of our non-partisan public service. At the committee clause-by-clause stage they came as technical witnesses to speak about aspects of the bill. However, during the back-and-forth, it became very clear, and they said as much, that this was important legislation to them as members of the public service, and that they were invested in getting this legislation passed.
Many of the amendments that we as Conservatives and other parties put forward were based on the recommendations of the Privacy Commissioner, who is a constitutional lawyer. He is a very intelligent man who I think put forward some very reasonable amendments. We as Conservatives and the Bloc Québécois wanted to have him sit in on the meeting so he could provide his insight on the more technical nature of some of the amendments and the issues we were talking about. The government would not allow that to happen. I think that is where this process really broke down and where it was shown that the government was not acting in good faith and not willing to work with opposition parties. The Privacy Commissioner is not partisan. He is an expert in his field. He is appointed by Parliament. Bringing him forward to committee to help us explore the very real privacy implications of this legislation I think would have done a great deal in easing its passage. It is a gargantuan bill with a number of amendments. It would have taken the committee a great deal of time to get through it, but I think the fact the government was not willing to hear from the Privacy Commissioner showed that it was not really interested in having a serious discussion on it.
I want to get into some other aspects of part 2 now. I am very concerned about these metadata provisions. Metadata, for those listening, is the stuff in our phones. It is not necessarily the content of the text messages or the browsing history, but it is very important information about our location, what phone numbers we are contacting and other such things. The government is putting forward a proposal that would require telecommunications and other companies to maintain this metadata for up to a year. It has been ruled unconstitutional in the European Union to mass-keep the data of people in the European Union, yet this is what the government is putting forward. Some people would say that it is not going to misuse the data and that it would have to get a warrant in this case. However, my issue is not necessarily what the government is going to do with it, but what malicious actors would do with it.
Imagine this allegory. The Government of Canada tells every home builder in Canada that they need to make a master key to open all the houses they produce and now it has the master key to open everyone's house in Canada. That is what it is asking the telecommunications companies, the Apples, the Googles and the Metas, for, a master key. Do I think the government or law enforcement are going to misuse it? That is not a serious fear, but who is to say that key is always going to be protected, that vulnerability is not going to be exploited or it would not be stolen by third party actors, foreign governments or malicious criminal networks? The government is creating vulnerabilities in encryption that would impact not just Canadians but people across the world, because the encryption is not just in Canada but across the world. This has now become a trade issue. That is why I am very concerned about this legislation.
